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The classical secretary problem (see Freeman (1983) and Ferguson (1989) for excellent
reviews) considers a decision maker (DM) who observes a random sequence of N
applicants for a job and wants to hire the very best one, assuming they can be strictly
ordered and N is fixed and known ahead of time. After she evaluates each applicant,
she must decide whether to end the search and accept the most recent applicant or
continue the search and permanently reject him. She must make this decision based
solely on the rank of the applicant relative to those already rejected, and seeks to
adopt a decision rule to maximize the probability that she chooses the best of the N
applicants. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) show that the optimal policy for large N is
to always skip the first N/e (∼ 37%) of the applicants, and accept the next applicant
who ranks higher than all previous applicants, a surprisingly concise and heuristic
strategy.
This model provides a useful framework to examine the dynamics of sequential
search. Many real-world decision makers face a similar situation where they ini-
tially have little or no information about their options, and gain useful context and
experience as they search. Examples might include a venture capitalist evaluating
investment proposals, a young couple looking to buy their first home, or an eBay
bidder deciding which auction she should participate in. Lindley (1961) refers to the
secretary problem as the marriage problem: A bachelorette goes on dates with po-
tential mates and must decide whether to propose marriage or reject the current date
and consider another. We assume that she cannot go back and propose to someone
she has already rejected, and that marriage proposals are always accepted. She wants
to choose the very best mate, but can only compare the current potential mate to
ones she previously dated and rejected. So she may meet someone who is better than
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anyone she has ever dated before but worry that proposing to him will deny her the
opportunity to marry someone even better later on.
Solving for the optimal decision rule also gives us a solid benchmark to analyze
decision-making by experimental participants. Seale and Rapoport (1997, 2000) test
stopping times under the classical secretary problem and find that participants may
tend to stop too soon. They propose that this may be a result of endogenous search
costs that affect the decision maker but are not explicitly accounted for in the ex-
periment’s payoffs. Stein et al. (2003) analyze classes of heuristic decision rules that
real-world decision-makers might use to solve the secretary problem.
However, the classical formulation makes several unrealistic assumptions:
1. The decision maker is only concerned with selecting the very best of all the
applicants. Choosing the second-best applicant is no better than choosing the
worst applicant; both yield zero value.
2. There is no cost to searching.
3. The number of applicants is fixed and known ahead of time.
A large body of literature tries to address these issues by extending the problem
in a number of different ways. To improve the first assumption, Chow et al. (1964)
specify that the objective is to minimize the expected overall rank of the selected
applicant. Later, Mucci (1973) generalizes this objective to maximizing the expec-
tation of any monotonic payoff function on the overall ranks. Bearden et al. (2006)
investigate experimental decision-making under this framework and still find a bias
towards stopping too early.
Rasmussen and Robbins (1975) solve a secretary problem when the number of
applicants is finite but unknown. Gianini and Samuels (1976) consider an infinite
problem, where the DM can observe an unlimited number of applicants and the
2
payoff depends on the selected applicant’s rank as well as an increasing loss function
through the search. Gianini (1977) shows that the optimal result can be found by
solving the finite problem and taking the limit as the number of applicants goes to
infinity.
In a closely related problem studied by Moser (1956) that we will refer to as
the full information problem, the DM observes a true value for each applicant when
he arrives and seeks to maximize the value of the applicant that she selects. We
refer to the classical secretary problem as the no-information problem because the
DM’s objective function and information are based solely on the ordinal ranks of the
applicants and need not also have underlying cardinal values. Many extensions of the
secretary problem fall somewhere in between, and so may be referred to as partial
information problems. Bruss and Ferguson (1993) solve a full information problem
with an objective of minimizing the expected rank of the selected applicant. Bearden
(2006) proposes a hybrid problem where applicants have random values but the DM
only observes an indicator variable for whether the applicant is the best so far. This
construction leads to another threshold rule where the DM always rejects the first
√
N applicants. Mahdian et al. (2008) allow the DM to fully observe each applicant’s
value when he arrives but specify that the distribution of values is unknown.
We propose a new partial-infomation problem that resolves all three of these
issues and also allows for convenient comparisons to the full information problem.
We address the first unrealistic assumption by using Bearden’s (2006) more gradated
objective function that allows for a continuum of values rather than an all-or-nothing
payoff. By using cardinal values, we can generate lists which are consistent with
our underlying ordinal rankings but express an intensity of preference as well. Our
formulation maintains the structure of the problem by only providing the DM with
ordinal information but allows for a more realistic model of payoffs and time-costs
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of continuing the search. An appealing feature of the classical secretary problem
is that the interviewer only observes relative ranks and must make decisions based
on this limited information. This means that the DM is building up a database of
information over time as she continues to interview more and more applicants, and
this experience allows her to better evaluate later applicants. One of the reasons
the secretary problem is so interesting is that it allows us to examine this tradeoff
between an information gain from interviewing more applicants and a cost (which
appears as an opportunity cost in the classical secretary problem and also as an
explicit time-cost in our formulation) of continuing the search. Almost all of the
extensions of the secretary problem in the literature still lead to a threshold strategy
of the form “always skip the first f(N) applicants, then select the next applicant who
satisfies some minimum qualification”. These cutoff rules have attractive heuristic
interpretations but are not asymptotically robust. Skipping the first .37N or
√
N
applicants with certainty is not realistic for arbitrarily large N . We provide the DM
with slightly better information and show that the optimal policy does not have to
follow this kind of threshold strategy.
Later, we eliminate the third unrealistic assumption by relaxing the finite appli-
cant limit N . We find that the DM may still skip a certain number of applicants with
certainty, but as N →∞ this exploration phase depends only on her impatience and
search costs, as measured through her discount rate r. For very low values of r, she
may be willing to skip a large number of applicants in order to build up information,
but this approach is not optimal for high r. The optimal policy also differs from the
previous literature in that after the exploration phase is over, the DM follows a more
nuanced search strategy. Her selectivity gradually decreases over time as the marginal
informational benefit of each additional applicant diminishes. The acceptance deci-
sion doesn’t just depend on whether the applicant is the best or not, but takes into
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account his relative rank and how far she is into the search.
2 The Model
1. There is one job opening available.
2. The number N of applicants is fixed and known ahead of time.
3. Applicants arrive sequentially at random times according to a homogeneous
Poisson Process, and are interviewed by the decision maker (DM). The interar-
rival times Ti between the arrival of the i− 1th applicant and the ith applicant
are i.i.d. exponential random variables with density g(t) = λe−λt. T1 can be
thought of as the time between the announcement of the job opening and the
arrival of the first applicant. So the length of time elapsed before the arrival of




4. The true value Xm of the mth applicant is an i.i.d. uniform random variable on
[0,1]. However, the DM observes only the relative rank of all of the applicants
who have been interviewed so far, and must make an immediate decision about
whether to accept or reject the applicant.
5. If an applicant is rejected, he cannot be recalled and accepted later. The search
ends when an applicant has been accepted. Let S be the index of the applicant




6. The DM’s objective is to adopt a strategy to maximize the expected discounted





subject to her limited information about Xm, where r is the DM’s constant
time-discounting rate. Alternately, we could think of the discount factors e−rTi
as all-inclusive search-and-interview costs, which are random and vary from
applicant to applicant.
3 The Optimal Policy
We derive the DM’s stopping criteria after interviewing the mth applicant, m < N :
Since the DM does not observe the true valuation of Xm, she must make her deci-
sion based on the rank of the current applicant relative to the m total applicants who
have been interviewed. We follow a mathematically convenient (but conversationally
somewhat counterintuitive) convention for ranking these applicants: If we observe m
applicants, we say that the worst applicant has a rank of 1 and let X(1) represent their
value. Likewise, the best of the m applicants has rank m and value X(m). The kth
order statistic X(k) of m i.i.d. U [0, 1] random variables (here we follow the convention
that X(1) ≤ X(2) ≤ · · · ≤ X(m), meaning that higher values of k correspond to higher





The DM should stop and accept the current applicant if and only if the expected
value of the current applicant is at least as great as the expected discounted value
of rejecting him and continuing the search. Note that the length of time tm elapsed
before the arrival of the mth applicant will not affect the DM’s choice because the
discounting factor e−rtm will be applied to the eventual payoff regardless.
To assist the DM in this decision, define V (m) as the expected discounted value
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of rejecting the current applicant and continuing the search after the mth applicant
is interviewed. V (m) can be thought of as the residual value of the search process to
the DM when she continues to follow an optimal decision rule. V (m) does not include
discounting for time that has already elapsed, since these are sunk costs for the DM
and should not affect her decision, as noted above.





XS | S ≥ m+ 1] (2)
So the DM will stop if and only if
E[Xm | Xm is the kth order statistic ] ≥ V (m) (3)
k
m+ 1
≥ V (m) (4)
k ≥ (m+ 1)V (m) (5)
If we denote the rank of the mth applicant by km ∈ N, this means that the DM
stops and accepts the current applicant when:
km ≥ d(m+ 1)V (m)e ≡ k∗(m) (6)
and rejects that current applicant and continues when:
km ≤ d(m+ 1)V (m)e − 1 (7)
Conditioning on whether the DM stops or continues after interviewing the next ap-
plicant leads to a first-order recursion:
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XS | S > m+ 1]P (S > m+ 1)
(8)
Since the values Xi are independent and identically distributed, it’s easy to show
that the rank km+1 of the m+ 1th applicant has an equal probability of taking any of
the values 1, 2, . . . ,m + 1. Our decision rule tells us that S > m + 1 ⇐⇒ km+1 ≤
d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e − 1, so
P (S > m+ 1) =
d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e − 1
m+ 1
(9)
P (S = m+ 1) = 1− P (S > m+ 1) = m+ 2− d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e
m+ 1
(10)
Conditioning (8) on the length of time Tm+1 elapsed between the arrival of the mth
and m+ 1th applicants, we have
V (m) = E[E[e−rTm+1Xm+1 | km+1 ≥ d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e] | Tm+1]
(







XS | S ≥ m+ 2] | Tm+1]P (S > m+ 1)
(11)
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V (m) = E[e−rTm+1E[Xm+1 | km+1 ≥ d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e]]
(







XS | S ≥ m+ 2]]P (S > m+ 1)
(12)
V (m) = E[e−rTm+1 ]
(
E[Xm+1 | km+1 ≥ d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e]
(







XS | S ≥ m+ 2]P (S > m+ 1)
)
(13)
We calculate E[Xm+1 | km+1 ≥ d(m + 2)V (m + 1)e] by conditioning on the rank of
the accepted applicant, and again using (1) and the fact that we are equally likely to
observe each of these ranks:











m+ 2− d(m+ 2)V (m+ 1)e
(14)

























represents the expected discount factor from waiting for the
next applicant. The first term represents the expected payoff if that applicant ranks
highly enough to be accepted, and the second term represents the expected payoff
if the next applicant is rejected and the search continues further, with both terms
weighted by their probabilities of occurring.
We can then solve for the continuation values V (m) and critical ranks k∗(m) via
backwards induction from a boundary condition: If the DM chooses to continue after
observing the N − 1th applicant, she must accept the N th and final applicant.
So after interviewing the N − 1th applicant:
V (N − 1) = E[e−rTNXN ] (17)
= E[E[e−rTNXN | TN ]]
= E[e−rTNE[XN ]]
= E[e−rTN ]E[XN ]
V (N − 1) = λ
2(λ+ r)
(18)
The recursion is too complex to derive an explicit solution for the infinite problem,
where we let the applicant limit N → ∞. However, we can show that the sequence
of values converges as we relax this boundary condition.
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Theorem 1: Let VN(m) be the expected value of continuing the search after ob-
serving the mth applicant when the maximum number of applicants is N ≥ m + 1.
Then VN(m) converges as N → ∞ for all m ≥ 0. We write this succinctly as
{VN} → {V∞}, where {VN} represents the finite sequence of N continuation values
that guide the DM in the finite problem and {V∞} represents the infinite sequence
of continuation values that guide the DM in the infinite problem.
This means that we can choose a large enough value of N to approximate the
sequence of values and cutoffs that guide the DM in the infinite problem. Figure 1
shows how the sequences {VN} of continuation values increase to {V∞} as we relax
the applicant limit N . Observe that for any fixed m, VN(m) is increasing to the limit
V∞(m). Also note that the continuation values V∞(m) increase (at a diminishing
rate) as m increases. This reflects the informational improvements from the DM’s
added experience. She uses this database of rejected applicants to better evaluate
future applicants, which leads to better decisions and improvements in the expected
outcome. Figure 2 shows the corresponding selectivity of the DM, expressed at each
stage of the search by the fraction of applicants who will be rejected if they follow the
optimal strategy with the continuation values from Figure 1. The search is largely
driven by the continuation values {V∞}, but we see that the DM starts to lower her
selectivity as she nears the applicant limit N . The DM is more willing to compromise
when she knows that she only has the opportunity to choose among a handful of
remaining applicants. This strategy is driven by the fear of exhausting the applicant
list and being forced to accept the very last applicant regardless of their rank. In
the infinite problem, this boundary condition never shows up and so we don’t see
the continuation values and selectivity drop off. However, we do observe a gradual
decrease in selectivity as m increases even in the infinite problem. We can attribute
this to the declining marginal benefits of additional experience. When m is low, the
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DM can afford to be more selective because she knows that rejecting applicants will
help her make a better choice later on. When m is high, rejecting more applicants
adds little to the DM’s ability to evaluate future applicants, so there is less incentive
for her to reject the current applicant. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the effects of
different discount rates. When the discount rate is high (indicating that the DM is
impatient), the continuation values are lower and she is less selective. Likewise, a
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Figure 1: Continuation values for finite and infinite problems when λ = 1
and r = 0.1












































































Figure 2: Selectivity (proportion k
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Figure 3: Continuation values for finite and infinite problems for various r
values when λ = 1
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Figure 4: Selectivity (proportion k
∗(m)
m
of applicants rejected after the mth
interview) for finite and infinite problems for various r values when λ = 1
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4 The Full Information Model
Now we introduce a full information analogue of the partial information sequential
search that we solved above. Here the DM always observes the true value of each
applicant as he arrives, so she no longer gains information from her past search
experience. As a result, her decision at each stage is driven purely by the time-
discounting and the limited number of applicants N . The full information model will
provide us with a useful benchmark that we can use to examine the effects of the
informational limitations when the DM can only observe ordinal rankings. Our full
information search generalizes Moser’s (1956) results by introducing interarrival times
and discounting and yields a recursion formula that agrees with Moser’s for r = 0.
1. There is one job opening available.
2. The number of applicants N is fixed and known ahead of time.
3. Applicants arrive sequentially at random times according to a homogeneous
Poisson Process, and are interviewed by the DM. The interarrival times Ti
between the arrival of the i− 1th applicant and the ith applicant are i.i.d. expo-
nential random variables with density g(t) = λe−λt. The length of time elapsed




4. The true value Xm of the mth applicant is an i.i.d. uniform random variable on
[0,1] and is fully observable by the DM .
5. If an applicant is rejected, he cannot be recalled and accepted later. The search
ends when an applicant has been accepted. S again denotes the index of the





6. The DM’s objective is to adopt a strategy to maximize the expected discounted




where r is the DM’s constant time-discounting rate.
5 The Full Information Optimal Policy
As before, the DM will assign a sequence of values, which we will write as V FI(m),
that capture the expected discounted value of rejecting the mth (current) applicant
and continuing the search, excluding the discount factor for the time tm that has
already elapsed and assuming the DM continues to follow an optimal policy. There
is no longer any uncertainty about the value of the current applicant, so the decision
rule is straightforward:
Stop if and only if
Xm ≥ V FI(m) (19)
Conditioning on whether the DM stops or continues after interviewing the next ap-
plicant leads to a simple first-order recursion:





XS | S ≥ m+ 1] (20)











XS | S > m+ 1] · P (S > m+ 1)
(21)
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Conditioning (21) on the length of time Tm+1 elapsed between the arrival of the mth
and m+ 1th applicants,






XS | S > m+ 1] | Tm+1] · P (S > m+ 1)
(22)
Our decision rule tells us that S = m+ 1 ⇐⇒ Xm+1 ≥ V FI(m+ 1), so
P (S > m+ 1) = P (Xm+1 < V
FI(m+ 1)) = V FI(m+ 1) (23)
P (S = m+ 1) = 1− P (S > m+ 1) = 1− V FI(m+ 1) (24)
and






XS | S ≥ m+ 2]] · V FI(m+ 1)
(25)















V FI(m+ 1)2 + 1
)
(27)
We get the same boundary condition as before by considering the DM’s choice
after interviewing the N − 1th applicant. If she continues the search she must accept
the N th and final applicant, meaning
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V FI(N − 1) = E[e−rTNXN ] (28)
= E[e−rTN ]E[XN ]
V FI(N − 1) = λ
2(λ+ r)
(29)
Again, we allow N →∞ in order to analyze the DM’s strategy in the infinite full
information problem, where there is no limit on the number of applicants.
Theorem 2: Let V FIN (m) be the expected value of continuing the search after ob-
serving the mth applicant when the maximum number of applicants is N ≥ m+ 1 in
the full information problem. Then V FIN (m) converges as N →∞ for all m ≥ 0.
We write this succinctly as {VFIN } → {VFI∞ }, where {VFIN } represents the finite
sequence of continuation values that guide the DM in the finite problem and {VFI∞ }
represents the infinite sequence of continuation values that guide the DM in the
infinite problem.







≡ V FI∞ ∀m ≥ 0. This is a very strong result,
condensing the entire search process in the infinite full information problem down to
a single continuation value V FI∞ . After observing any applicant at any time, the DM
simply compares his value to this continuation value and accepts if and only if his
value is at least as large as V FI∞ .
Figure 5 illustrates how the sequences {VFIN } of continuation values in the finite
full information problems converge to {VFI∞ }. Note that these values also define
our stopping rule, so higher continuation values imply higher selectivity. As noted







for all m. Figure
6 compares the infinite full information problem with our infinite partial information
problem from before. Since continuation values are fixed in the full information case,
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it serves as a useful benchmark to look at how the DM gains information through the
search when she can only observe the relative ranks of previously observed applicants.
Figure 7 provides a table comparing expected values at the beginning of the search,
before the DM has interviewed any applicants. We see that these ex ante expected
search payoffs are a bit higher in the infinite problem than in the finite problem, and
this improvement is larger for lower discount rates because the boundary condition is
more likely to affect the DM. We also see that the expected payoffs are significantly
higher with full information than when the DM only observes relative ranks (partial
information). This increase is largest when the discount rate is high, because the DM
tends to interview only a few applicants before ending her search. This means that
she does not have the time to build up experience to help her make a decision. So
having full information from the beginning of the search yields a huge improvement
in her ability to make a good decision. Full information still benefits a DM with a
low discount rate, but she is patient so she can afford to build up a large database
of rejected applicants that help her make a better decision later on. As a result, her
expected search payoff doesn’t show as large of an increase when she is given full
information.
19




































Figure 5: Continuation values for finite and infinite full information prob-
lems when r = 0.1 and λ = 1.
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Figure 6: Comparison of continuation values from the infinite problem with







(Finite Problem, N = 10):  V10(0)  .7241  .6012  .4167 
(Infinite Problem):  V∞(0)  .7898  .6079  .4167 
Full 
Informa6on  
(Finite Problem, N = 10):  V10(0)  .8263  .7239  .5366 
(Infinite Problem):  V∞(0)  .8682     .7298  .5367 
Figure 7: Table of ex ante expected search payoffs V (0) with full information
and with only relative ranks for various r values when λ = 1.
6 Discussion
Our hybrid secretary problem addresses the three major shortcomings of the classical
secretary problem and yields a more realistic optimal policy. The other advantage
of our model is that it allows us to isolate and quantify the DM’s three primary
considerations when constructing a strategy:
1. The DM has to make decisions based on limited information, but accumulates
more and more information as she continues to search. Every new applicant
who is rejected adds to the database of experience that allows the DM to better
place future applicants (this is what motivates the DM to skip the first 37%
of the applicants with certainty in the classical problem). So the DM will
be more selective earlier in the search because of the informational benefit of
rejecting applicants. In the infinite problem, we can quantify the marginal
information improvement from rejecting themth applicant by comparing V∞(m)
and V∞(m+ 1). We can also look at the cost of the limited information at any
point in our search (in either the finite or infinite problems), by comparing
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V (m) with the corresponding V FI(m) from the full information problem. In
particular, the quantity V FI∞ (0) − V∞(0) gives us the ex ante value of having
full information compared with the purely ordinal information in our infinite
discounted problem.
2. WhenN is finite, the DM worries about reaching the end of the list of applicants.
This forces her to be less selective as she gets closer and closer to this boundary.
We can quantify the cost of this limit by comparing VN(m) with V∞(m) from
the full information problem (as well as the optimal cutoffs k∗N(m) and k∗∞(m)).
3. There is a time cost to the search and the ultimate payoff is discounted according
to how long the search took. So the DM has an incentive to be less selective
and stop sooner than she otherwise might have in order to reduce this cost. We
can quantify the effects and expected reduction in payoff of this discounting by
comparing V (m) when r > 0 with V (m) when r = 0 (as well as the optimal
cutoffs k∗(m) in each case).
This framework also outlines a complementary structure for the limited informa-
tion models that often show up in the economics literature. In auction theory (see
Krishna, 2002), valuations are frequently defined through interdependent or common
value models, where players are endowed with private signals and must infer infor-
mation about other players’ signals from their behavior. Under the structure of our
hybrid secretary problem, the player would also be updating her own information as
she makes decisions.
For example, we could explore the connections between matching theory and de-
cision making under uncertainty by studying behavior in a dynamic matching game
with interdependent values. Classic two-sided matching theory (see Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990) provides a simple but powerful framework to define a stable match
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and an algorithm that guarantees a solution. Remarkably, these results only require
that the individuals provide a strict ordinal ranking of their preferences over all in-
dividuals on the other side of the market. This type of model is useful for exploring
behavior and designing incentive-compatible mechanisms in a number of situations,
including medical labor markets, the college admissions problem, and public school
choice. However, the model assumes that individuals have full information about
their preferences. This means that their rankings are static and only submitted once
at the start of the matching process, with no dynamic interactions beyond computa-
tion of the equilibrium. By limiting players’ information to ordinal rankings of the
individuals whom they have already observed, we would be able to consider matches
generated over time that might not otherwise meet the stability criteria of classic
static matching theory.
Our hybrid secretary problem can also be extended in a number of different direc-
tions. We could generalize the underlying value distributions and arrival process and
relax the assumption of independence between applicants. This would increase the
mathematical complexity of the problem, but would allow us to examine the effects of
correlation between applicants. Another interesting study would test the experimen-
tal behavior of decision makers in our framework, which would complement previous
research on decision making in the classical secretary problem. The more nuanced ob-
jective and strategy sets would give us a better look into the decision making process,
and the controls λ, N , and r might provide explanations for the biases that previous
studies have suggested. The increased size of the strategy sets would also allow for a
broader spectrum of heuristics to compare to the mathematically optimal strategy.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix any integer m ≥ 0. VN(m) can be calculated via back-
wards induction for any finite N ≥ m+ 1 (the lowest N for which VN(m) is defined).
Recall that VN(m) is the expected value of rejecting the current applicant and con-
tinuing the search after observing the mth of N total applicants and consider the
sequence {VN(m)}∞N=m+1. VN+1(m) ≥ VN(m) because we are simply adding an addi-
tional applicant (whose true value is independent of any previous applicants) on to
the end of the list of remaining selections for the DM. So the DM could follow the
exact same stopping strategy as before, when there were N total applicants, and sim-
ply accept the N th with certainty. This would mimic the search process and expected
payoffs exactly. However, the DM is maximizing her search policy over a larger set
of possible strategies than before, and she may choose a different policy. But if she
wants to do so it must be the case that VN+1(m) is at least at high as VN(m). This
holds for all N , so VN(m) is monotonically nondecreasing in N . Also note that VN(m)
is trivially bounded below by 0 and above by 1 since 0 ≤ ert ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ XS ≤ 1. So
if we let N →∞, VN(m) converges to a limit V∞(m) by the Monotonic Convergence
Theorem. Since this holds for all nonnegative integers m, we can construct a lim-
iting sequence {V∞} whose terms V∞(m) are the continuation values in the infinite
discounted secretary problem. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Fix any integer m ≥ 0. Then V FIN (m) is easily calculated via
backwards induction for any finite N . Starting at N = m+1 (this is the lowest N for
which V FIN (m) is defined), increment N upwards and consider the sequence of values






We can write the recursion from our decision rule as
V FIN (m) = f(V
FI




Now observe that for fixed boundaries N and N + 1, backwards induction gives us




) . . . ))




) . . . )))
So we have
V FIN+1(m) = f(V
FI
N (m))
The first term of our sequence satisfies 0 < V FIm+1(m) =
λ
2(λ+r)
< 1 and we show by
induction on N that all other terms in the sequence also satisfy 0 < V FIN (m) < 1.
Assume 0 < V FIN (m) < 1. Then 0 < V FIN (m)2 < 1 and 1 < V FIN (m)2 + 1 < 2, so
multiplying through by λ
2(λ+r)
gives us 0 < λ
2(λ+r)






1. Observe that f is continuous and f ′(x) = λ
λ+r
x. So by the Mean Value Theorem,
for all N ≥ m + 1, there exists c between V FIN (m) and V FIN+1(m) (so 0 < c < 1) such
that
f ′(c) =
f(V FIN+1(m))− f(V FIN (m))




V FIN+2(m)− V FIN+1(m)
V FIN+1(m)− V FIN (m)
0 < λ
λ+r
≤ 1, so 0 < λ
λ+r
c < 1. In particular, this satisfies
|V FIN+2(m)− V FIN+1(m)| ≤
λ
λ+ r
c |V FIN+1(m)− V FIN (m)|
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Letting N →∞, our sequence is contractive and therefore convergent. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Conditioning on the DM’s choice after observing the mth
applicant in the infinite full information problem (the recursion follows exactly as it
did in the finite full information problem) gives us V FI∞ (m) = f(V FI∞ (m + 1)). Also,
observe that
V FI∞ (m) = lim
N→∞
V FIN (m) = lim
N→∞




) . . . ))
= lim
N→∞




) . . . )) = lim
N→∞
V FIN (m+ 1)
= V FI∞ (m+ 1)
Substituting into the recursion, we get

































Note that the first term is ≥ 1 and the second term is ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ V (m) ≤ 1. So
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